The present volume results from an initiative to foster cooperation between scholars of Himalayan languages in Europe. The initiative was launched five years ago and has brought about a series of annual workshop meetings and individual cooperative projects (cf. http://www.isw.unibe.ch/EuroHimal). The 1998 workshop, held in Heidelberg, was devoted to the role that notions of speech act participants play in the grammar of various Himalayan languages, and the present collection represents, with some additions and some subtractions, the proceedings of this workshop. In the following I will give some background on the rationale for the topics covered in this volume, especially on the ways in which the indexing of speech act participants is related in Himalayan languages to evidentials and other epistemological operators. I will close this introduction with a brief outline of the structure of the volume.

1. FROM EPISTEMOLOGY TO PERSON-MARKING

Modern Tibetan dialects have elaborate systems of epistemological coding through copulas and cliticized auxiliaries derived from them. Terminology and analysis varies, but what emerges as the functional core and the historical root of these systems is the marking of ‘old, assimilated, first-hand, personal, intimate knowledge’ vs. ‘newly acquired, recent knowledge’ (e.g. DeLancey 1992, 1997). What is at stake is knowledge of the situation, but, as Katrin Häsl shows in her contribution to this volume, the notion of assimilated and personal knowledge can have various contextual side-effects, such as implicating that the speaker (or, in
questions, the addressee\(^1\) was herself volitionally engaged in events leading to the reported situation. Compare the following Dege dialect examples from Häslér’s chapter. (I regularize writing of the palatal glide to <y>.)

(1) a. khô ñañà yø.
   3SG.ABS here be[ASSIMILATED]
   ‘He is here.’ (as an answer to “is he here?”, implicating that the speaker makes a well-informed statement.)

   b. khøño: ñø òô ñø-yi ñ(žø-si) yø.
   3PL.ABS food beg-NZR go-CONTINUOUS AUX.ASSIMILATED
   ‘They are going to beg for food.’ (The speaker has told them to do so.)

In some varieties, notably in the best-known variety, i.e. in what is labeled Standard Spoken Tibetan (SST) by Nicolas Tournadre (this volume), the epistemological operator no longer takes the situation per se as its argument, but is specifically focused on one of the participants in the clause. As a result, the marker does no longer merely indicate that the speaker (or addressee in questions) has old, ingrained knowledge of the situation, but specifically, that she has such knowledge of a participant. This generally means that the conjunct person herself is, will be or was directly involved in the situation (cf. DeLancey 1992), and the marker thus assumes an ‘egophoric’ or ‘ego-modal’ function (Tournadre 1994, 1996, this volume). This is illustrated by the following example from SST:\(^2\)

(2) a. ñas dpe.cha ñag.po ñta-gi.yod. (Tournadre 1996: 275)
   1SG.ERG Tibetan.book well read-IMPERFECTIVE ASSIMILATED
   ‘As for me, I am reading the sacred texts.’ (unlike the others)

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\(^1\) In the following I refer to the combined set of speaker in statements and addressee in questions as the ‘conjunct person’, following Hale (1980) in terminology, but without endorsing an analysis of this in terms of implicit quote frames. For discussion, see Tournadre’s and Häslér’s chapters in this volume.

\(^2\) A interesting parallel to this is found on the Eastern borders of the Himalayas, in the Loloish language Sangkong: here, the grammaticalized reflex of a first person pronoun ña\(^5\) indexes either the speaker’s personal acquaintance with the situation or his or her direct involvement in it (Matisoff 1993).
b. khoṅ ṅa.’i rtsa-la phebs-kyi.yod. (Tournadre 1996: 223)  
3SG.ABS 1SG.GEN at-DAT come-IMPERFECTIVE ASSIMILATED  
‘He comes to my place’ (frequent fact well-known to the speaker)

c. khor dṇul tog.tsam ’dug /*yod.  
3SG.DAT money some be be[ASSIMILATED]  
‘He has some money.’ (DeLancey 1997: 44)

Unlike in Written Tibetan, Dege and most other dialects reported on in this volume, the auxiliaries yod (roughly, existential) and yin (roughly, equational) are here restricted to clauses in which the conjunct person is involved as a participant in one way or the other, and this is why yod is ungrammatical in (2c). As Tournadre (1996: 220, note 9) points out, a Written Tibetan sentence like nam.khar skar.ma ma fn.po yod ‘the are a lot of stars in the sky’ could only mean ‘I have a lot of stars in the sky’ in the standard spoken language! (cf. also cf. Hein, this volume, on in in the Tabo/Spiti dialect.)

While in principle any participant can fall into the scope of Tibetan epistemological operators, in verb-headed clauses it is typically the agent that is at issue as the willful instigator of a situation. This manifests itself most strongly in SST, where the conjunct/egophoric or assimilated knowledge markers corresponding to WT yod and yin typically focus on the agent. While in the imperfective system, this is a tendency only (cf. (2b) above), other tense/aspect forms are more restrictive: the marker yin in the aorist and the future implies that the speaker was or will be a willful instigator. This is shown by the following contrast discussed by DeLancey (1990):

(3) a. ṅas dkar.yol bcag-pa.yin.  
1SG.ERG cup break-AORIST CONJUNCT AGENT  
‘I broke the cup (intentionally),’

b. ṅas dkar.yol bcag-soṅ.  
1SG.ERG cup break-AORIST  
‘I broke the cup (accidentally).’
In the aorist system, the bias towards volitional instigators is further strengthened by the fact that in SST, *yin* not only contrasts with *soň* but also with what Tournadre (1996, this volume) calls the ‘ego-receptive’ auxiliary *byuũ*. This auxiliary is as conjunct/egophoric as *yin*, but it focusses on patients, e.g. in *ńa na*- *byuũ* ‘I got sick’ or *g.yar-byuũ* ‘[x] lent me sth.’; the latter is directly opposed to *g.yar-pa.yin* ‘I lent [x] sth.’ (Tournadre 1996: 232). This is in line with the etymological root sense of *byuũ*, which is ‘to show up, come forth, emerge, become visible in front of the speaker’s eyes’ (Roland Bielmeier, Randy LaPolla, p.c.), and the auxiliary often simply indicates that the action is spatially directed towards the speaker (also cf. DeLancey 1990).

This bias towards agents seems to be further grammaticalized in the Central Tibetan variety Lhomi, which is spoken in the upper reaches of the Aruũ valley in Eastern Nepal. From Versalainen & Versalainen’s (1980) short description it appears that the bias is found in this language across all tenses and aspects, and that the semantic notion of agent is furthermore replaced by a syntactified notion of transitive or semitransitive actor. Thus, forms cognate with WT *yin* would appear to be true person-markers, indexing the conjunct person in actor role (‘…q designates a “tense and rising pitch contour”’):

(4)  a. ņe  taku-la  ra  'coŋ-enq.
 1SG.ERG friend-DAT goat sell-CONJUNCT A³
   ‘I sold a goat to a friend.’

   b. ņa  'khim-laq  'lip-enq.
 1SG.ABS house-DAT come-CONJUNCT A
   ‘I arrived in the house.’

The agentive bias is a general concomitant of conjunct-marking in the Himalayas (but not necessarily elsewhere; see Curnow 2000). It is clearly pronounced in Kathmandu Newar, where the conjunct form is restricted to scenarios with the conjunct person as agent in a controlled event (Hale 1980, Hargreaves 1991). The

³ I use the Dixonian abbreviations S for sole argument of intransitives, A for transitive actors and O for (primary or direct) objcets.
same bias is also detectable in Dolakha Newar, although this language grammati-
calizes person in the sense of 1st vs. 2nd vs. 3rd rather than in the sense of a
conjunct category (speaker in statements, addressee in questions): first person
agreement tends to be limited to agentive subjects in Dolakha (Genetti 1994: 107,
DeLancey 1992). These findings may shed light on typological curiosities found
in other person-marking systems in the Himalayas. I focus on Kiranti languages,
which are bordered by both the Dolakha and Lhomi speaking areas.

First, verb agreement systems sometimes show traits of what one may call
split-accusativity, the reverse of standard split-ergativity: whereas theories of
alignment splits predict that higher-ranking persons trigger a nominative-accusati-
ve alignment of markers (cf. Silverstein 1976, DeLancey 1981, Comrie 1981,
among others), verb endings in several Kiranti languages show ergative-absolu-
tive or tri-partite alignment in the first person singular that contrasts with traces of
nominative-accusative or neutral alignment of persons lower on the hierarchy. In
Hayu (Michailovsky 1988), for example, the suffix -ηο (non-past; -sunη in the past)
covers first person singular S and O referents (e.g., bu?-ηο ‘I get up’, pu?-ηο ‘he
lifts me up’) whereas the A-function is covered by -η/-Ν/-sunη if acting on a third
person (e.g., pυ-η ‘I lift him up’) and by the portemanteau morpheme -no (-Nno in
the past) if acting on a second person (pυk-no ‘I lift you up’). Third person
referents, by contrast, show zero-marking in the singular in all functions and are
coded by the equally role-neutral suffixes -tshe and -me in the dual and plural,
respectively. There is even a trace of accusative alignment in the form of the
suffix -ko ~ -kv, which is restricted to third person objects in past tense forms
(e.g., pυk-kv-η ‘I lifted him up’, pυk-ko ‘you/he lifted him up’ vs. zero-marked buk
‘he gets up’). Essentially the same distribution holds for Yamphu (Rutgers 1998),
Limbu (van Driem 1997, Michailovsky, this volume), Belhare (Bickel 1995, in
press), and other Kiranti languages. Especially in the South and East of the Kirant,
the accusative alignment of the third person is often strengthened by dedicated
plural markers for S and A (e.g., m(e)- in Limbu) distinct from those marking O-
arguments (-si).

This distinct coding of first person singular A-arguments may be explained as
a variation on the same theme as the speaker-as-agent concept noted above for
Tibetan and Newar languages: like in Lhomi, the semantic notion of agent is replaced by the syntactic notion of transitive subject, the ‘A’ argument; like in Dolakha Newar, person is conceptualized as speaker vs. addressee vs. third rather than as the conjunct category. Evidence that such conceptualizations indeed informed the development of these Kiranti agreement systems comes from the following: if distinct A-marking for the speaker is ultimately based on well-established knowledge of agency, we would expect deviations from this with non-singular first person referents, because here the speaker’s knowledge about agency is less definite. This is indeed just what one finds. In non-singular numbers, the first person markers do not all follow the ergative or tripartite alignment of the singular. Hayu, for example, does not distinguish argument roles for first person nonsingular numbers (e.g., *pux-kok* ‘x lifts us [excl. pl.]’ or ‘we [excl. pl.] lift him’, *bux-kok* ‘we [excl. pl.] get up’). Yamphu has a nonsingular marker -*ma* which is role-neutral in 1>2 scenarios and restricted to A and S arguments in others; furthermore, first person nonsingular O-arguments are left unmarked if acted upon by third persons. In Limbu, deviations from ergative alignment in the first person nonsingular are mainly due to the intrusion of impersonal markers, which is discussed by Boyd Michailovsky in this volume.

A second curiosity that can perhaps be better understood in terms of a Tibetan-inspired ‘epistemology of persons’ is what LaPolla (1989, 1992, in press) has called a ‘non-first person actor prefix’, re-labeled by van Driem (1993) as the ‘marked scenario’ prefix in Dumi. The category, marked in Dumi by *a-* , encompasses all scenarios in which speaker or addressee are involved except those where the speaker is actor. That is, it covers the relations 2>1, 2>3, 3>1, 3>2 as well as second person intransitive scenarios. While such a category also seems to underlie the distribution of a prefix (*i-* ) in Khaling (Toba 1978:159), it has been noted outside the Kirant as well, viz. in the Nungish languages spoken

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4 also cf. Ebert (1994) for paradigms. The category also seems to play a role in Camling (Ebert 1997), where the second person prefix *ta-* is in complementary distribution with an inverse marker (*pa-* ) covering 3PL>3SG and 3>1 scenarios. The combined scenario set of these complementary devices is the same as the one covered by ‘marked scenario’ prefixes in the other languages (except for the inclusion of the inverse 3PL>3SG relation).
on both sides of the Northern portion of the Sino-Burmese border (Dulong ṇo-, Rawang ḍê-; LaPolla 1989, 1992, in press; DeLancey 1989). Since the category is attested in distinct branches of Tibeto-Burman, it is possible, as DeLancey (1989) proposes, that it descends as such from a quirk of the proto-language, but it is also possible — and perhaps no more speculatively so — that the category reflects parallel grammaticalization motivated by the epistemology of persons: the scenarios that are ‘marked’ are just those with participants about which the speaker has second-best knowledge as it were of agency. The speaker knows best about agency where she herself is actor or subject. She knows virtually nothing about agency if neither she nor her partner in dialogue are involved in the situation. In between these two extremes, and therefore of special status, are just the ‘marked’ scenarios, i.e. situations where the addressee is involved as agent or undergoer, or the speaker as undergoer. In these cases, information about agency is, albeit unknown to the speaker, at least directly accessible in the *hic et nunc* of a conversation, either through consulting the co-present addressee or through examining the nature of the event by which the speaker or addressee is affected as an undergoer.

While these two observations and speculations await further research, there is another, more established sense in which the epistemological categories found in Tibetan are conceptually related to agreement morphology, and this involves the notion of *empathy*, first introduced by Kuno (1987) in analyses of Japanese and English and defined as the degree to which the speaker identifies or ‘sides’ with a participant in the clause. In Tibetan, empathy is one of the important effects that the marking of assimilated knowledge can have. As argued by Häslar (this volume), the function of the ‘assimilated knowledge’ marker yî: (WT yin) in Dege examples like the following is to signal that the speaker empathizes with the actor argument, i.e. takes the actor’s viewpoint in portraying an event:

(5) laso, laso. ṇg; khōla ṣeg; tshō.  
yes yes 1SG.ERG 3SG.DAT say will  
khō  ṇatā ō-le yî:  
3SG.ABS immediately come-IMPERFECTIVE AUX:ASSIMILATED
‘Yes sir, yes sir! I’ll tell him. He shall come immediately’. (as a response to a request to send someone. See Häsler, this volume, for discussion.)

By taking the third person actor’s viewpoint, the speaker signals her certainty about the person’s future actions and thereby shows that she has the authority to fully comply with the request.

The concept of empathy is also well-known to underlie the hierarchical ranking of speech act participants over third persons, since, as noted by Kuno & Kaburaki (1977) and DeLancey (1981), it is easier to empathize with oneself and one’s partner in dialogue than with others. This ranking has proven a powerful theoretical tool in explanations of split-ergativity, inverse-marking and the treatment of first and second person forms in many languages of the Himalayas (see, among others, DeLancey 1981, Ebert 1987, 1991, Michailovsky 1988, LaPolla 1992, van Driem 1992, Bickel 1995, Pokharel 2054, and Jacquesson, this volume). The empathy hierarchy has also recently been identified as a fundamental parameter of verb agreement in Maithili, an Indo-Aryan language that has been and still is in contact with various Tibeto-Burman languages (Bickel et al. 1999 and King, this volume). The basic issue in all these cases is that scenarios with speaker or addressee involvement, i.e. scenarios with a naturally high empathy degree, require special or more elaborate marking, especially when neither speech act participant is in actor role.

2. STRUCTURE OF THE VOLUME

The chapters proceed from purely epistemological issues to purely person-related issues. The volume starts with John Peterson’s description of mirativity and evidentiality in Nepali, the Indo-Aryan lingua franca in much of the Central Himalayas. This is then followed by a series of Tibetan studies, first on dialects where the epistemological categories do not index (conjunct/disjunct) person on the clause level. Roland Bielmeier gives a detailed survey on copulas and auxiliaries in Western Tibetan, which is followed by a case-study of the auxiliary
'dug in Central Tibetan by Marianne Volkart. The next four chapters are devoted to various dialects — Brigitte Huber on Lende (Kyirong), Felix Haller on Shigatse and Themchen, Katrin Häslter on Dege and Veronika Hein on Tabo/Spiti — while the subsequent chapter by Nicolas Tournadre concentrates on literary and Standard Spoken Tibetan and also provides a survey of the form of auxiliaries in a number of dialects. In the last two varieties discussed in this part, Tabo and SST, auxiliaries are more closely tied to conjunct person-indexing, i.e. they indicate that the speaker (addressee in questions) plays some role in the propositional schema of the clause, typically that of an agent. This bridges over to the second part of the volume, which is devoted to systems of person-marking. François Jacquesson reports on his recent field research on numerous person-marking systems in North-East India. Boyd Michailovsky focusses on the marking of first person plural in Limbu and, in a companion article, gives a brief presentation of Hodgson’s Limbu paradigms from 1857. The volume ends with John King’s treatise of how affinal kin relations between speaker and addressee can be indexed in Dhimal by special respect pronouns and corresponding agreement morphology on the verb.

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